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Abstract
This paper disentangles ﬂuctuations in disaggregate prices into macroeconomic and
idiosyncratic components using a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) in order
to shed light on sectoral inﬂation dynamics in Switzerland. We ﬁnd that disaggregated prices
react only slowly to monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks, but relatively quickly
to idiosyncratic shocks. We document that there is a large heterogeneity across sectors in the
reaction to monetary policy shocks and show that sectors with larger volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks react more readily to monetary policy. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the rational
inattention model of price setting. We also ﬁnd that sectors, which change prices infrequently,
react less strongly but if they do change their prices, they adjust them by a large amount.
This suggests that the source of sluggish response to aggregate shocks is heterogeneity in
menu costs rather than rational inattention. Furthermore, even though prices respond with a
signiﬁcant delay to identiﬁed monetary policy shocks, we ﬁnd no evidence of a price puzzle on
average. For single sectors, however, we still ﬁnd a hump-shaped response which can partially
be explained by the fact that, by law, rents are tied to interest rates in Switzerland.
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1 Introduction
Recent evidence on micro price adjustment shows some challenging eﬀects for the theoretical
literature on monetary non-neutrality. Although prices are only infrequently adjusted at the micro
level, the degree of price stickiness is too low to explain the persistence of aggregate inﬂation rates.
Hence, there is an inconsistency between the micro and the macro facts on prices, which calls for
theoretical models that can bridge this gap.
The literature has taken diﬀerent directions for modelling this feature of price-setting
behaviour. Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) argue that if idiosyncratic shocks are large relative
to macroeconomic shocks it may be rational for individual ﬁrms to direct most of their attention
to the idiosyncratic shocks. As a consequence of this rational inattention, macroeconomic
shocks are incorporated only slowly into prices. Another strand of the literature emphasises
the macroeconomic implications of diﬀerences in price-setting behaviour across ﬁrms or sectors.
Various authors have argued that monetary policy may have diﬀerent welfare implications
depending on whether or not price-setting behaviour is characterised by cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes. Carvalho (2006) stresses that heterogeneity in
price stickiness and thus monetary policy responsiveness across sectors is important because it
leads to more persistent real eﬀects of monetary policy. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) make a
similar argument in a menu-cost model. Barsky et al. (2007) show that, even if most prices are
ﬂexible, a small durable goods sector with sticky prices may be suﬃcient to make output and
inﬂation react to monetary policy as if most prices were sticky. Thus, the degree of monetary
policy eﬀectiveness depends disproportionately on the sectors with larger rigidities (Aoki, 2001).
The goal of this paper is therefore to confront these theoretical predictions with empirical
evidence. Using a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) and disaggregated index items
from Switzerland’s consumer price index (CPI), we disentangle idiosyncratic and macroeconomic
shocks using the framework presented in Boivin et al. (2009). We then calculate sectoral price
responses to a monetary policy shock and identify the sectors with more sluggish price responses
where inﬂation stabilisation may be more important.
The results imply that disaggregated prices react only slowly to monetary policy and other
macroeconomic shocks, but relatively quickly to idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, there is a lot
of heterogeneity in these reactions across sectors. This ﬁnding corroborates recent evidence for
the US (Boivin et al., 2009; Mackowiak et al., 2009) and the UK (Mumtaz et al., 2009) and is in
line with predictions from both strands of the theoretical literature.
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Focusing on the sources of the cross-sectional variation of price responses to a monetary policy
shock, we ﬁnd that the response of ﬁrms to a monetary policy shock increases with the volatility
of the idiosyncratic shocks. Our estimates suggest that 70% of the cross-sectional diﬀerences in
price responses can be explained by the degree of volatility of idiosyncratic shocks. Controlling for
the volatility of macroeconomic shocks does not changes the result. This is not consistent with the
rational inattention model of price setting, which implies that ﬁrms facing volatile idiosyncratic
shocks will pay less attention to macroeconomic shocks. In addition, we ﬁnd that the extent of the
response to a monetary policy shock is related to the degree of price stickiness. The price response
to a monetary policy shock tends to be sluggish in those sectors with infrequent but large price
adjustments. This is consistent with the idea that cross-sectional diﬀerences in price adjustment
costs, or menu costs, explain diﬀering price responses to a monetary policy shock.
We then use the results from the FAVAR to examine the pattern of responses of disaggregate
inﬂation rates to monetary policy shocks. The results show that prices respond to a monetary
policy tightening with a lag of about 6 to 7 quarters. In contrast to traditional VAR analysis,
the response of the CPI to a monetary policy shock displays no price puzzle, i.e., no temporary
increase in inﬂation after a monetary policy tightening (cf. Christiano et al., 1999). This is due
to the fact that the FAVAR incorporates more information than VARs, where economic activity
is proxied by a small number of variables only.
Although we ﬁnd no price puzzle at the aggregate level, there is a substantial amount of
heterogeneity in the responses of disaggregate prices. Therefore, we look at the responses of
individual CPI items aggregated to sectors such as goods or services separately. We ﬁnd that
durable goods react with a signiﬁcant delay of 12 quarters while semi-durable and non-durable
goods prices react much faster. We ﬁnd a rather slow response for services. Rents, especially,
increase signiﬁcantly after a monetary policy tightening, which is not surprising, given the fact
that rents are linked to the short-term mortgage rate in Switzerland, so that monetary policy
tightening is likely to lead to higher rents. We also ﬁnd a hump-shaped response of prices for
durable goods and services excluding rents. We argue that this may be due to the cost channel of
monetary policy, which is more important in the case of larger inventory holdings (durable goods)
and real wage rigidities (services).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the
FAVAR methodology. Section 3 discusses our results, and Section 4 concludes.
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2 Data and methodology
We follow Boivin et al. (2009) and use a FAVAR to analyse disaggregate inﬂation dynamics.
Compared to a standard VAR, the advantage of the FAVAR developed in Bernanke et al. (2005) is
that it exploits the information content of a considerably larger set of macroeconomic variables. In
addition, the framework makes it possible to decompose the ﬂuctuations of disaggregate price series
into a common and an idiosyncratic component, which can be used to assess the relative importance
of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic factors in explaining disaggregate price ﬂuctuations.
Factor analysis allows us to summarise the information from a large number of time series,
using a relatively small set of estimated factors. Let us assume that the Swiss economy is aﬀected
by a vector Ct of common components. One of the common components is the 3M Libor as a
measure of the monetary policy instrument (Rt), which can be observed.1 The remaining common
components are denoted by a K×1 vector of unobserved factors Ft. These unobserved factors may
reﬂect general economic conditions such as real economic activity, the general rate of inﬂation,
and asset prices. Let Ft and Rt follow the transition equation
Ct = Φ(L)Ct−1 + υt , (1)
where Ct = [F
￿
t Rt]￿ and Φ(L) is a conformable lag polynomial. The error term υt is an
i.i.d. random vector with mean zero, and t is the time index t = 1,...,T. The transition equation
represents a VAR in the unobserved factors and the 3M Libor.
Since we do not observe Ft we extract it from a large data set of economic time series. The
number of these series is denoted by N, which should be large relative to K and T. Let the series
be denoted by a N×1 vector Xt that is related to the common factors according to the observation
equation
Xt = ΛCt + et , (2)
where Λ is a N × (K + 1) matrix of factor loadings. The principal component estimation which
is applied to extract the factors Ft allows for some cross-correlation in the error term (et) that
vanishes as N goes to inﬁnity (cf. Stock and Watson, 2002). Once the factors have been extracted,
the factor loadings can be estimated by OLS. Equations (1) and (2) represent a dynamic factor
model where – conditional on Rt – the variables in Xt are noisy measures of the underlying
1The Swiss National Bank sets an operational target range for its chosen reference interest rate, the 3M
Libor (cf. e.g. Jordan et al., 2010). Usually, it aims to hold the 3M Libor in the middle of that range.
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unobserved factors Ft. Via the transition equation (1), the unobserved components Ft can always
include arbitrary lags of Xt even though Xt depends only on the current and not on lagged values
of Ft.
The matrix Xt consists of a panel of quarterly data from Q1 1978 to Q3 2008. The data set
includes 142 macroeconomic time series and the growth rates of 151 index items from the Swiss
CPI.2 An index item is deﬁned as the price index at the lowest level of disaggregation. We refer
to the growth rates of these indices as disaggregate inﬂation. We have aggregated some of the
individual CPI items to a higher level in order to obtain consistent price indices over the whole
sample period. In addition, we had to exclude some of the items underlying the CPI today, due to
data availability restrictions. Also, we removed administered prices since it is not clear whether
they are aﬀected by monetary policy or not. The resulting data set includes 80% of the CPI at
average weights.3
From the data set we extract the factors as suggested by Boivin et al. (2009). A recursive
procedure is applied to impose Rt as a common component on the data set Xt and to obtain a
consistent estimate of Ft. Initially, we obtain the ﬁrst K principal components from Xt, denoted
by F
0
t. We then estimate ˆ λ
0
R by regressing Xt on F
0
t and Rt. Next, we subtract the factor Rt by
calculating ˜ X
0
t = Xt − ˆ λ
0
RRt . Then, we estimate F
1
t as the ﬁrst K principal components of ˜ X
0
t.
The procedure is repeated several times to obtain the ﬁnal estimate of Ft.
The question as to how many factors we should extract from the data can be answered by
the test suggested in Bai and Ng (2002). Their test suggests that three factors summarise the
information content of Xt well. Therefore, we set K = 3 and end up with four common components
(cf. Figure 1).4 All in all, the factors explain 34% of the variation in Xt on average. The median
R2 is higher at 55%.
It is worth noting that we do not identify the factors as speciﬁc economic concepts.
Nevertheless, we can examine the size of the corresponding factor loadings or the correlation
of the factors with the underlying time series to ﬁnd out which part of the economy a factor is
most closely related to. Table 7 of the Appendix lists the 15 largest loadings (in absolute terms)
of the time series in Xt included in each of the four factors. The ﬁrst factor appears to be mostly
related to price series such that it may capture general inﬂation dynamics. The second factor is
2A list of the series is provided in the Appendix in Tables 4 and 5. The series have been seasonally adjusted
and transformed to induce stationarity, if necessary.
3The average weights of various subaggregates of the CPI are given in Table 6 of the Appendix.
4As Bernanke et al. (2005) emphasise, the test does not answer the question of how many factors we should
include in the VAR to capture the relevant dynamics but only how many factors capture the information in the
data set well. However, we have experimented with more factors and the results remain qualitatively the same.
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Figure 1: Estimated factors










































Notes: The ﬁgures display the estimated factors used in the FAVAR. Factor 1 is mostly related to prices, Factor
2 to (inverse) real activity, and Factor 3 to (foreign) goods prices with sales. Factor 4 shows the normalised 3M
Libor.
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mostly driven by data covering the real economy, such as orders, sales or business sentiment. Most
of the factor loadings are negative such that the factor is probably negatively correlated with real
activity. It could therefore serve as an inverse real activity measure. This is supported by the
fact that the factor is strongly correlated with one of the output gap measures that is calculated
regularly by the Swiss National Bank (contemporaneous: -0.67; two quarters ahead: -0.79; cf.
Figure 8 in the Appendix). The third factor is driven by prices for clothing and footwear. This is
probably due to the fact that these prices are very volatile and highly seasonal. The Swiss Federal
Statistical Oﬃce started to collect end-of-season sales prices in May 2000. This resulted in a higher
volatility of this factor even though the series have been seasonally adjusted. By construction,
the fourth factor is the 3M Libor. It is related to various interest rate spreads, the mortgage rate
but also to technical capacities and various price series. Alternatively, instead of looking at the
size of the factor loadings, one can compare correlations of the factors with the macroeconomic
time series in Xt. Table 8 of the Appendix shows the 15 largest correlation coeﬃcients in absolute
terms. The correlations would lead to the same interpretation of the factors.
The observation equation can be used to disentangle the idiosyncratic from macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations for each CPI index item included in Xt. Equation (2) implies that the decomposition
for each price series is of the form
πit = λiCt + eit , (3)
where πit denotes the log quarterly change of CPI index item i at time t, λi is the row vector
of factor loadings for item i, and eit is the item-speciﬁc error term, which captures idiosyncratic
inﬂation dynamics that are not attributed to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. This allows us to relate
every CPI index item to the transition equation, and therefore we can calculate the response of the
disaggregated price series to various shock measures. We label λiCt as the common component
of inﬂation and eit the idiosyncratic component henceforth.
3 Results
The results are presented in the following order. Section 3.1 focuses on the common and
idiosyncratic components of the CPI index items. First, we analyse their relative contribution
for disaggregate inﬂation in a descriptive manner. Then, we calculate impulse responses in the
FAVAR framework to obtain an estimate of the sluggishness of price responses and we relate
diﬀerences in responses to monetary policy shocks to diﬀerences in the volatility and persistence
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Table 1: Volatility and persistence of quarterly inﬂation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sd(πit) sd(λiCt) sd(eit) R2 ρ(πit) ρ(λiCt) ρ(eit)
Aggregate series
CPI Total 0.29 0.21 0.20 0.52 0.86 0.92 -0.13
Goods 0.33 0.21 0.25 0.41 0.61 0.84 0.16
Services 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.69 0.89 0.93 0.55
Excl. oil 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.65 0.84 0.92 0.02
Excl. rents 0.29 0.19 0.22 0.42 0.68 0.91 -0.01
Disaggregated series
CPI Average 0.69 0.29 0.61 0.29 0.42 0.84 0.01
Wght. average 0.50 0.23 0.43 0.30 0.44 0.67 0.13
Median 0.42 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.52 0.87 0.08
Min. 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.69 0.29 -1.99
Max. 4.08 1.14 3.92 0.67 0.90 0.94 0.81
Std. 0.70 0.19 0.69 0.17 0.35 0.10 0.45
Notes: The table gives the standard deviation (in percent) and persistence (ρ) of inﬂation (πit), the common
component (λiCt), and the idiosyncratic component (eit). The R2 gives the share of variation in πit explained by
λiCt. Weighted average statistics are calculated using average CPI weights over the whole sample period.
of inﬂation and heterogeneity in price-setting behaviour. Section 3.2 then analyses the monetary
policy transmission in more detail. We show that, on average, prices react with a considerable
lag, and examine why we ﬁnd a price puzzle in some sectors but not in others.
3.1 Idiosyncratic vs. macroeconomic shocks
3.1.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for aggregate CPI measures (upper panel) and
disaggregate items of the CPI (lower panel). In Column (1), we report the standard deviation
for the aggregate and disaggregate inﬂation rates (πit). Column (2) shows the standard deviation
for the estimated common components (λiCt) and Column (3) for the idiosyncratic component
(eit). Column (4) reports R2 statistics measuring the fraction of inﬂation variation explained by
the common component.
The standard deviation of aggregate inﬂation amounts to 0.29, which is slightly higher than
what is found by Boivin et al. (2009) for the US (0.24). The volatility for goods (0.33) is
slightly higher than the volatility for services (0.26). A large share of the volatility in aggregate
measures of inﬂation is due to ﬂuctuations in the four common components. The R2 indicates
that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations explain 52% of aggregate CPI inﬂation variation, and even 69%
of the inﬂation variation for services. Relative to the rather small number of factors we use these
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ﬁgures appear to be substantial.5 For the CPI excluding rents the variation attributed to the
common component is somewhat lower (0.42) than for the total CPI. This implies that rents are
quite strongly driven by common component shocks. This may be due to the fact that rents are
linked to mortgage rates in Switzerland and thus may be related to the 3M Libor. The opposite
applies when excluding oil prices. Then the R2 is higher than for the overall CPI. It appears that
oil product prices are to a larger extent driven by idiosyncratic shocks which is intuitive since they
primarily depend on ﬂuctuations in crude oil spot prices.
Column (5) reports the degree of persistence for the original series and Columns (6) and (7)
for the common component and the idiosyncratic component, respectively.6 For all subaggregates
the persistence of the common component is higher than the persistence of the idiosyncratic
component. Idiosyncratic persistence for total CPI inﬂation is small (-0.13). For services,
idiosyncratic shocks seem to be more persistent than for the other subaggregates. The persistence
of the common component is close to unity for all subaggregates.
The lower panel in Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the 151 CPI index items. In line
with previous studies, the average volatility of disaggregate inﬂation rates (0.69) is higher than
the volatility of the aggregate CPI (0.29). Interestingly, the variation in the common component
explains only about 29% of the variation of the disaggregated inﬂation rates on average.7 This
indicates that disaggregated prices are mainly driven by idiosyncratic shocks while aggregate CPI
can be explained to a large extent (52%) by macroeconomic shocks. Turning to the degree of
persistence, we ﬁnd that the average persistence of disaggregated inﬂation (0.42) is lower than
the persistence of aggregate inﬂation (0.86). This ﬁnding is in line with many studies that show
that the aggregation process can explain a large amount of aggregate inﬂation persistence (cf. e.g.
Altissimo et al., 2009; Elmer and Maag, 2009, for the euro area and Switzerland respectively).
Table 2 displays correlations of various statistics of disaggregate inﬂation rates and their
idiosyncratic and common components. It shows that the persistence and volatility of
inﬂation are negatively correlated (-0.64). This is the case for both, the idiosyncratic
components of inﬂation (-0.50) and the common components (-0.54). Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that the volatility of the idiosyncratic component is highly correlated with the volatility of the
5In an R2 sense we would always explain more of the inﬂation variation if we increase the number of factors.
Therefore, it seems crucial to test for the number of factors.
6We ﬁt for each series an autoregressive process with L lags of the form yit = ρi(L)yi,t−1 + εit, where L is
the optimal number of lags chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and yt denotes the corresponding
series (πit, λiCt, or eit). The measure of persistence is deﬁned as the sum of all coeﬃcients of the AR(L) process
ρ(yit) = ΣL
l=1ρi(l). In addition, we have computed these statistics with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
and with a ﬁxed lag length L = 6. The results do not change qualitatively.
7The results are qualitatively the same taking a weighted average.
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Table 2: Correlations of descriptive statistics for disaggregate inﬂation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sd(πit) sd(λiCt) sd(eit) R2 ρ(πit) ρ(λiCt) ρ(eit)
sd(πit) 1.00
sd(λiCt) 0.79 1.00
sd(eit) 0.99 0.74 1.00
R2 -0.49 -0.11 -0.53 1.00
ρ(πit) -0.64 -0.48 -0.65 0.65 1.00
ρ(λiCt) -0.37 -0.54 -0.34 0.24 0.50 1.00
ρ(eit) -0.49 -0.28 -0.50 0.40 0.65 0.12 1.00
Notes: The table gives the correlation of various descriptive statistics of disaggregate inﬂation (πit), the common
component (λiCt), and the idiosyncratic component (eit). The R2 gives the share of variation in πit explained by
λiCt.
common component, suggesting that ﬁrms with highly volatile idiosyncratic shocks react more
strongly to macroeconomic shocks. This is an interesting result because it suggests that the
dynamics of disaggregate inﬂation rates are not in line with the rational inattention model of
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). The model relies on the assumption that ﬁrms with large
idiosyncratic shocks pay less attention to macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, it would imply that
sectors with large idiosyncratic shocks react little to macroeconomic conditions. By contrast,
the R2 is negatively correlated with the volatility of the idiosyncratic component, such that in
sectors with volatile idiosyncratic shocks little of the inﬂation variance is explained by the common
component. Taking this result at face value, one might argue that ﬁrms facing volatile idiosyncratic
shocks react less to macroeconomic shocks, which is in line with rational inattention.8 A more
detailed discussion of the consistency of the rational inattention model with our empirical results
is given in Section 3.1.3, in the context of an identiﬁed monetary policy shock.
3.1.2 Impulse response analysis
The FAVAR makes it possible to calculate impulse responses for various types of shocks. The
transition equation is estimated by OLS and we choose a lag polynomial of the order of 5.9 Our
results are presented as impulse responses of the disaggregated price series on three types of shocks.
The ﬁrst shock is the response of the disaggregate inﬂation (πit) to an idiosyncratic shock (eit), the
second the response to a shock to the common component (λiCt), and the third is an identiﬁed
8The negative correlation may be also related to the fact that the idiosyncratic component not only captures
structural disturbances but also sampling error in the CPI index items. As Boivin et al. (2009) emphasise, the
measurement error does not generally distort the estimates of the common component if the sampling errors are
item-speciﬁc. However, the explanatory power of the common component is lower as the item-speciﬁc errors are
larger.
9Note that information criteria (AIC, BIC) would favour a more parsimonious lag speciﬁcation. However, since
we use seasonally adjusted data and there may be some seasonality remaining in the data we chose to use more
than four lags for our quarterly model. The main conclusions do not change qualitatively when we use fewer lags.
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monetary policy shock.
Our identiﬁcation strategy for the monetary policy shock implies that the 3M Libor may
respond to contemporaneous ﬂuctuations to the factors, but that none of the factors can respond
within one period to unanticipated changes in monetary policy. It is worth noting that, despite
our recursive identiﬁcation scheme, all underlying indicators in Xt are allowed to respond
contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks via the observation equation even though the factors
Ft are assumed to remain unaﬀected in the current period. Simultaneous responses of the variables
in Xt can thus be directly related to monetary policy.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the responses of each of the 151 CPI index items to an idiosyncratic
shock of minus one standard deviation (dashed lines). The responses are calculated based on
autoregressive processes ﬁtted on the idiosyncratic component (cf. footnote 6). The solid line
represents the weighted average response, where the weight of each index item in the CPI was
averaged over the sample period. The ﬁgure indicates that the majority of price series responds
very quickly to shocks in the idiosyncratic components. Most of the shocks are incorporated within
one period. This pattern suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are only weakly autocorrelated. Since
these shocks do not appear to have a persistent eﬀect on disaggregate prices, the persistence in
aggregate inﬂation rates is unlikely to be driven by idiosyncratic shocks. Panel (b) presents the
responses of each CPI index item to a common component shock. Again, the responses stem from
single autoregressive processes ﬁtted on the common component. Therefore, the responses should
be interpreted as an average response to a variety of underlying macroeconomic shocks. Prices
react slowly to macroeconomic shocks. It takes about three years for most of the series to converge
to their new level. We have additionally calculated the responses as weighted averages for various
sectors such as goods and services or imported and domestic products. The main conclusions for
all subaggregates are more or less the same: the response to an idiosyncratic shock is typically
fast but it takes several years for a macroeconomic shock to feed fully into price changes.10
Prices may react very diﬀerently to various kinds of macroeconomic shocks such that the
average responses displayed in Panel (b) may be misleading. Therefore, Panel (c) shows the
responses of the disaggregate series to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with weighted
and unweighted averages and the aggregate CPI. On average, we ﬁnd a sluggish response of prices
due to a monetary policy shock. Interestingly, there is substantial heterogeneity in the responses
to a 25 basis point increase in the 3M Libor. Some series show a rapid decline, while others
10More ﬁgures are available upon request.
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Figure 2: Response of CPI index items to idiosyncratic, common component, and monetary
policy shocks

















(b) Common component shock








(c) Monetary policy shock
Notes: Estimated impulse responses of CPI index items (in percent) to (a) an idiosyncratic shock of one standard
deviation, (b) to a shock to the common component of one standard deviation and (c) to an identiﬁed monetary
policy shock. (a) and (b) are based on autoregressive processes ﬁtted on the idiosyncratic and common components
and therefore represent average responses to a variety of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks. The monetary
policy shock is identiﬁed in the FAVAR framework. Thick solid lines represent weighted average responses. The
monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor. The crosses in Panel (c) represent the
unweighted average response, while the dashed line represents the response of the aggregate CPI to a monetary
policy shock. The dashed vertical line shows the quarter at which the weighted average response turns negative.
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display a hump-shaped response with prices ﬁrst increasing after the monetary policy shock and
decreasing afterwards.11
3.1.3 Sectoral heterogeneity
The sectoral responses to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock are informative in that they reveal
that there is a lot of heterogeneity across sectors in the response. Moreover, we can also learn
something from the sectoral heterogeneity itself, as the responsiveness to a monetary policy shock
of a given sector can be matched with other characteristics from the sector, which makes it possible
to evaluate whether the observed responses are consistent with various theories of price setting.
Recall from the descriptive analysis that the average persistence of the idiosyncratic component
is close to zero (0.01), whereas the persistence of the common component is very high,
at 0.84 (cf. Table 1). Together with the ﬁnding that the volatility of the idiosyncratic
components of inﬂation are large on average and negatively correlated with the R2, measuring
the explanatory power of the common component for inﬂation, this evidence may support the
rational inattention model presented in Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). Their theoretical
model predicts that price-setting ﬁrms pay signiﬁcantly more attention to idiosyncratic conditions
than to macroeconomic conditions if the former are more volatile, implying that prices respond
quickly to idiosyncratic shocks and slowly to macroeconomic shocks. Empirical support for this
model has been found in Mackowiak et al. (2009) using a dynamic factor model based on sectoral
CPI data estimated with Bayesian methods.
In what follows we shed light on this issue by explaining the cross-sectional variation of the
monetary policy responses with features of their cross-sectional inﬂation dynamics. We therefore
run regressions of the following form:
responsei,4 = α + β1sd(eit) + β2sd(λiCt) + β3ρ(eit) + β4ρ(λiCt) + εi . (4)
That is, we explain the accumulated response of CPI item i to a monetary policy shock after four
quarters in terms of the volatility and persistence of the idiosyncratic and common components.
The speciﬁcation diﬀers from Boivin et al. (2009) in that it additionally includes the volatility
and persistence of the common component. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the
volatility of the common component is correlated with the volatility of the idiosyncratic component,
11The impulse responses for several macroeconomic variables that might be of interest, although not directly
related to the questions examined in this paper, can be found in Figures 9 to 14 in the Appendix.
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suggesting that the eﬀect of idiosyncratic volatility might be overstated when excluding the
volatility of the common component from the regressions.
Table 3: Cross-sectional variation of the accumulated monetary policy shock responses after 4
quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)













durationi × sizei 0.109∗∗∗
[0.032]
Constant 0.056∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.075 -0.035 0.052∗
[0.006] [0.055] [0.048] [0.025] [0.029]
Observations 151 151 151 124 124
R2 0.71 0.26 0.71 0.29 0.41
Notes: The duration is measured in quarters while the responses and standard deviations are measured in percent.
The frequency and size of price changes are measured as fractions and rates of changes, respectively. The coeﬃcients
are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are given in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) suggests that the response to a monetary policy
shock increases with the volatility of the idiosyncratic and common components.12 This actually
challenges the assumptions underlying the model proposed by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009),
that ﬁrms, that face large idiosyncratic shocks, pay less attention to macroeconomic shocks. Their
model would imply that larger idiosyncratic shocks would mitigate the response to a monetary
policy shock after controlling for the volatility of macroeconomic shocks (cf. p. 98 Mackowiak et al.,
2009). Our ﬁndings suggest that, even if we include the volatility of macroeconomic shocks in the
regression, the sectors that are faced with larger idiosyncratic shocks incorporate the monetary
12As the dependent variable is the accumulated response to a tightening of monetary policy, the negative
coeﬃcients imply that CPI items with more volatile idiosyncratic and common components show a stronger decline
in their price level, i.e. they react more to the monetary policy shock.
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policy shock to a larger extent.13 This ﬁnding rather supports some of the menu-cost models, where
ﬁrms follow Ss-pricing rules, and idiosyncratic shocks rather than macroeconomic shocks trigger
price adjustments. Such a model implies that a ﬁrm incorporates macroeconomic shocks once the
idiosyncratic shock is large enough to push a ﬁrm’s price above the adjustment threshold.14 This
suggests that the source of price stickiness stems from menu costs rather than rational inattention.
This contrasts the ﬁndings of Mackowiak et al. (2009) that sectors with more volatile
idiosyncratic shocks imply a lower speed of response to macroeconomic shocks. While
Mackowiak et al. (2009) restrict the analysis to price data only, we identify the common component
using a large data set covering many aspects of the economy. To show the impact of restricting the
data set to price data, we replicated the Mackowiak et al. (2009) model with monthly CPI data
for Switzerland. It turns out that in this case the standard deviation of the common component is
strongly negatively correlated (-0.91) with the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component.
This result would indeed suggest that ﬁrms react less to macroeconomic shocks in those sectors
with volatile idiosyncratic shocks and it would favour the rational inattention model. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd the same correlation when we use our approach to identify the common components but
limit the data set to price data. The negative correlation therefore rests on the fact that the
common component is derived from the cross section of price data rather than from a broader
data set with other macroeconomic variables. We prefer our approach because the identiﬁcation
of the common component is based on more information in a broader data set.
However, not only the volatility of the idiosyncratic and common components may aﬀect the
response to a monetary policy shock but also their persistence. Column (2) reports the estimated
coeﬃcients from regressing the accumulated responses on persistence. The persistence of both
the common and the idiosyncratic shock mitigate the response to a monetary policy shock. In
addition, we run a regression with all variables included. The coeﬃcients are reported in Column
(3). The volatility of common and idiosyncratic shocks are associated with a stronger response
to a monetary policy shock, which corroborates the ﬁnding we have outlined earlier in the paper.
The magnitude of the eﬀect of the volatility is remarkably similar and the persistence measures
are no longer signiﬁcant when controlling for the volatility of common and idiosyncratic shocks.
This suggests that the persistence of shocks is not responsible for cross-sectional diﬀerences in the
reaction to monetary policy shocks. Also, the R2 does not improve when including the persistence
13We replicated this result for the US with the data used in Boivin et al. (2009), which were kindly provided by
Marc Giannoni. After we excluded one outlier with implausibly high volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, which are
driven by a structural break in the outlying series, the result holds for the response of sectoral prices up to six
months after the identiﬁed monetary policy shock.
14cf. Dotsey et al. (2006), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008), or Midrigan (2008), for example.
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measures in the model with the volatility measures, and the explanatory power of the persistence
measures alone is about three times smaller than the explanatory power of the volatility measures,
which explain more than 70% of the diﬀerences in responsiveness to a monetary policy shock across
sectors.
In addition, we test whether the cross-sectional diﬀerences in the responsiveness to a monetary
policy shock can be associated with diﬀerent degrees of price stickiness and the heterogeneity
in price-setting behaviour. Boivin et al. (2009) examine the cross-sectional dispersion of price
responses to a monetary policy shock focusing on the volatility and persistence of the idiosyncratic
component, and measures of the degree of competition within each sector. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms in
industries with persistent and volatile idiosyncratic shocks react faster to monetary policy shocks.
Furthermore, prices adjust more sluggishly in industries with a lower degree of competition. Our
paper shows an interesting additional test to evaluate the diﬀerent assumptions underlying the
theoretical models since idiosyncratic shocks are on average more volatile than common component
shocks (cf. Table 1). Therefore, rational inattention would predict that sectors with many price
adjustments will tend to react slowly to macroeconomic shocks as these adjustments are likely to
be associated with idiosyncratic shocks. By contrast, Carvalho (2006) shows that in a multi-sector
Calvo model, heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustments implies diﬀerences across sectors
in the speed of adjustment to shocks, which leads to larger and more persistent real eﬀects of
monetary policy shocks. In this model, sectors with more price adjustments tend to react faster to
macroeconomic shocks, but sectors with lower price adjustment frequencies have disproportionate
eﬀects on aggregate inﬂation persistence, because the sectors with more price adjustments take
their slow adjustment into account when re-setting their prices. Thus, we examine whether the
degree of price stickiness in a sector explains its degree of responsiveness to the monetary policy
shock. Furthermore, we control for the average size of price adjustment within a sector, as the
response of a given sector is also inﬂuenced by the average size of adjustment, and not just its
frequency. To do so, we match the responses with statistics from CPI micro data15 and estimate
responsei,4 = α + β1durationi + β2sizei + β3durationi × sizei + εi (5)
15We essentially use the frequency and size statistics at the index item level from Kaufmann (2009) calculated
between 1993 and 2005. In some cases we have aggregated the statistics to a higher level, consistent with the CPI
index items used in the FAVAR. Since we do not have micro data on all components (most importantly rents) the
number of observations is smaller than in the previous regressions. Nevertheless, the Swiss data has the advantage
that the statistics on the duration and size of price adjustments come from the same source as the CPI index items
used in the FAVAR. This is not the case for US data.
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where durationi = log(0.5)/log(1−fpci) gives the implied median duration of price spells for index
item i, as a measure of price stickiness in sector i, where fpci denotes the average fraction of prices
that change in a given quarter. Meanwhile, sizei gives the corresponding absolute average size of
price adjustments in sector i. We ﬁnd that a higher degree of price stickiness in a sector leads
to a smaller response to a monetary policy shock (Column 4). This is in line the assumptions
underlying the model of Carvalho (2006) but not with the rational inattention model. Furthermore,
the sectors that display a larger average absolute size of price adjustments are more responsive.
This is in line with the ﬁndings from Columns (1) and (3) that the sectors that face larger shocks
respond stronger to monetary policy shocks.
An unanswered question in the price-setting literature is whether menu costs are indeed a source
of price rigidity and the resulting monetary non-neutrality. If that was the case, sectors with larger
menu costs should adjust prices less frequently, but if they adjust, then they adjust by a large
amount. Then we would expect the interaction term between the duration and absolute size of
price adjustments to be positive, which would imply that the sectors with large menu costs are less
responsive to a monetary policy shock and, on the aggregate, delay the overall response of the CPI.
This is indeed the ﬁnding reported in Column (5). Sectors in which prices are adjusted infrequently,
but by a large amount, are those that display a lower responsiveness to monetary policy shocks.
With the inclusion of the interaction term, the duration variable is no longer signiﬁcant. This
suggests that indeed diﬀerences in menu costs may at least partially explain diﬀerences in monetary
policy responsiveness. This ﬁnding is in line with the state-dependent pricing models that assume
a distribution of menu costs across sectors to be responsible for monetary non-neutrality (cf. e.g.
Dotsey et al., 1999; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2010).16
3.2 Monetary policy transmission
The FAVAR allows us to analyse the monetary policy transmission process in more detail. In
particular, we analyse the speed of response in various sectors and the existence of a price puzzle.
16The regression results are consistent for various horizons of the responses. For longer horizons, the eﬀects are
even more pronounced. We have added the responses for 8 quarters as a robustness check in the Appendix in
Table 9. In addition, we have repeated the regressions including the size and duration of price changes with the
price responses to a common component shock. The results are remarkably similar, so that the conclusions apply
to other macroeconomic shocks as well (cf. Table 10 in the Appendix).
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3.2.1 The lag of monetary policy transmission
Let us ﬁrst look at the responses of the factors (cf. Figure 3). 90% conﬁdence intervals are given
as dotted lines. They are derived via the bias-corrected bootstrap algorithm proposed by Kilian
(1998). In line with much of the literature we ignore the fact that the factors are estimated
and therefore subject to uncertainty. Note that we still obtain correct conﬁdence intervals if the
number of time series in Xt is large relative to the number of time periods (cf. Bai and Ng, 2004).
Figure 3: Responses of the factors to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock












































Notes: Responses to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence intervals. The monetary shock
is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor. Factor 1 is the general prices factor, Factor 2 the (inverse)
real activity factor and Factor 3 the factor of (foreign) goods prices with sales. Factor 4 shows the 3M Libor.
Figure 3 shows that the factor capturing price dynamics (Factor 1) exhibits a hump-shaped
response. That is, inﬂation increases at ﬁrst and then declines after roughly 7 quarters. As one
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would expect, real activity declines after a contractionary monetary policy shock (shown in Panel
b; recall that Factor 2 measures inverse real activity). It is interesting to see that Factor 3 does
not react systematically to a monetary policy shock. As we have noted, it mainly captures the
common dynamics of end-of-season sales prices. The interest rate (Factor 4) displays some inertia
after the initial shock. It ﬁrst raises slightly and then returns to zero after seven quarters.
Recall that Figure 2, Panel (c) gives the weighted average response of the CPI items along
with the response of the aggregate CPI to a monetary policy shock. The weighted average of the
responses (solid line) initially stays close to zero up to about 6 to 7 quarters and then starts to
decline. This is consistent with the fact that price spells are long, slightly more than one year on
average (cf. Kaufmann, 2009). A similar reaction is found for the aggregate CPI (dashed line).
The unweighted average of the individual items displays a faster reaction (crosses).
3.2.2 The Swiss price puzzle: fact or artefact?
The literature has proposed various arguments for why econometricians tend to ﬁnd a price puzzle,
i.e. a rise in the aggregate price level in response to a contractionary innovation in monetary
policy (for an overview cf. Walsh, 2003, Chapter 1). One is that the price puzzle is a “fact” and
that prices do indeed rise after a monetary policy tightening. The theoretical argument here is
that a cost channel of monetary policy exists. We discuss this ﬁrst explanation in more detail in
section 3.2.3 and now focus on the second explanation, which is that not enough information is
included in usual three-variable VARs, and therefore the price puzzle is only an “artefact”.
Sims (1992) and many other studies found that including a commodity price index in the VAR
reduces the price puzzle considerably (cf. also Eichenbaum, 1992). Also, Leeper and Zha (2001)
stress that including money in the analysis removes the price puzzle (cf. Assenmacher-Wesche,
2008, for Switzerland). Giordani (2004) argues that typical VAR studies include GDP growth
instead of an output gap measure. He shows that the omission of an output gap spuriously leads
to a price puzzle in a class of commonly used models. Once an output gap measure is accounted
for, the price puzzle disappears without including a commodity price index.
The FAVAR approach encompasses these arguments. The large data set reﬂects a larger share
of the information available to a central bank than a typical three-variable VAR (with GDP,
inﬂation and a short-term interest rate). Indeed, Bernanke et al. (2005) and Boivin et al. (2009)
show for the US that the price puzzle found in standard VARs by and large disappears when
augmenting a VAR by one or more factors.
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If the information contained in the common factors was the sole reason why the price puzzle
disappears we would expect that this also holds when we augment a standard three-variables VAR
with our factors. The FAVAR model nests this VAR and therefore we can assess whether the
additional information reduces the price puzzle (cf. Bernanke et al., 2005). We can illustrate the
impact of more accurate information contained in the factors by using the factors from the FAVAR
along with GDP, CPI inﬂation and the 3M Libor in a VAR where we identify the monetary policy
shock by recursive ordering. Figure 4 illustrates how, by including one or two factors, the price
puzzle by and large vanishes.17
Figure 4: Response to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock in a (FA)VAR

















Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) of the CPI and GDP to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock. The
ﬁrst VAR contains the CPI, GDP and the 3M Libor (solid line). The second and third VAR (dashed and dotted
lines) contain additionally 1 and 2 factors according to the procedure by Bernanke et al. (2005). The monetary
shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
17We have experimented with the inclusion of more factors and with total CPI excluding rents. The results do
not change qualitatively.
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3.2.3 Sectoral monetary policy responses
Figure 2, Panel (c), illustrates that, although prices react with a lag of 6 to 7 quarters on
average, there is a large degree of heterogeneity across individual CPI index items. As noted
earlier, heterogeneity in price stickiness and thus monetary policy responsiveness across sectors
is important because it means that the real eﬀects of monetary policy are more persistent (cf.
Carvalho, 2006). The heterogeneity implies that sectors with lower price adjustment frequencies
have disproportionate eﬀects on aggregate price dynamics. Barsky et al. (2007) show that, even if
most prices are ﬂexible, a small durable goods sector with sticky prices may be suﬃcient to make
aggregate output react to monetary policy as if most prices were sticky. Thus, the speed of the
aggregate monetary policy response depends more crucially on the sectors with larger rigidities.
In this section, we show price responses for various sectors to an identiﬁed monetary policy
shock. Figure 5 shows the response of the weighted average of all goods series to a monetary policy
shock (Panel a). Interestingly, prices of goods decline immediately and signiﬁcantly after such a
shock. Meanwhile, the prices of services display a delayed response and are lowered only after 15
quarters (Panel b).
Figure 5: Response of goods and services prices to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock












Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor. The impulse responses
are aggregated from the individual CPI index items using the average CPI expenditure weight over the estimation
period.
To obtain a more detailed picture of the response of goods prices, we have illustrated the
responses of durable goods, semi-durable goods, and non-durable goods separately (cf. Figure 6).
The reaction to unexpected monetary policy tightening shows some diﬀerences. Durable goods
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prices start falling about 12 quarters after the shock. Meanwhile, semi-durable goods prices react
with a lag of 4 quarters, and non-durable goods react instantaneously.
Figure 6: Response of durable, semi-durable and non-durable goods prices to an identiﬁed
monetary policy shock


















Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor. The impulse responses
are aggregated from the individual CPI index items using the average CPI expenditure weight over the estimation
period.
An explanation of why non-durable goods respond more quickly to monetary policy shocks than
durable goods is that prices are more sticky in the durable goods sector. Based on the frequency
of price changes presented by Kaufmann (2009), we can infer that prices of durable goods are
stickier than prices of non-durable goods. The average duration of price spells for durable goods
amounts to 4.2 quarters, while for non-durable goods it is 3.1 quarters. Semi-durable goods lie in
between.
In Figure 7, we split up the response of services into rents and other services. Switzerland is
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unusual in that rents have a large weight in the Swiss CPI (on average 19.5%) and they are linked
to mortgage rates by law (cf. Stalder, 2003). Owners of a rental apartment are usually allowed
to change prices of rents under existing contracts when mortgage rates rise. Thus, higher interest
rates may feed into higher rents and thus into the CPI. Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows the response
of rents. Indeed, rents display a strong increase after monetary policy tightening. However, other
services, as shown in Panel (b), still react with a signiﬁcant delay of about 12 quarters to a
monetary policy tightening.
Although we showed in Section 3.2.2 that the price puzzle can be resolved by the FAVAR
approach, some sectors still exhibit a hump-shaped response to a monetary policy shock. This
suggests that in these sectors the price puzzle is a “fact”. Theoretically, a hump-shaped price
response may occur if higher interest rates translate into higher marginal costs of production. This
is called the cost channel of monetary policy transmission.18 One explanation of a cost channel is
that ﬁrms hold working capital. To the extent that ﬁrms must pay the factors of production before
receiving revenues from selling their products, they rely on borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries,
which makes their cost of production depend on the interest rates they have to pay for their loans.
Similarly, if ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance inventories via ﬁnancial intermediaries, higher interest rates
can feed into higher prices as the real cost of inventories tend to increase on impact in response
to monetary policy tightening.
Among the sectors which exhibit a signiﬁcant hump-shaped response are durable goods.
Arguably, inventory holdings are more important for durable goods than for non-durable goods
and services. To the extent that ﬁrms have to ﬁnance their inventories in advance, monetary policy
may temporarily lead to higher costs for inventory holdings and thus lead to higher prices. While
there is a legal explanation for the hump-shaped response for rents, the impulse response function
for other services is still puzzling. One explanation may be that the services sector depends more
on external ﬁnance than the manufacturing sector, and thus the cost channel is more pronounced in
the services sector. Some evidence in favour of this hypothesis is provided in de Serres et al. (2006),
who show that most services industries rely more heavily on external ﬁnance than manufacturing
industries.19 Another explanation may be that a high degree of real wage rigidity induces marginal
cost to adjust slowly. Together with the fact that the share of labour in total factor inputs is large
for services, this is likely to amplify the cost channel of monetary policy because if the factors
of production are pre-ﬁnanced and unit labour costs are not ﬂexible then prices of services are
18cf. e.g. Barth and Ramey (2002); Ravenna and Walsh (2006); Chowdhury et al. (2006); Rabanal (2007);
Tillmann (2008); Henzel et al. (2009) for theoretical and empirical results on the cost channel of monetary policy.
19cf. de Serres et al. (2006), Table A3, for details.
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Figure 7: Response of rents, services prices excluding rents, and the CPI excluding rents to an
identiﬁed monetary policy shock











(b) Services excl. rents





(c) CPI excl. rents
Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor. The impulse responses
are aggregated from the individual CPI index items using the average CPI expenditure weight over the estimation
period.
likely to increase more strongly after monetary policy tightening compared to the case where unit
labour costs are ﬂexible.
We ﬁnd support for these arguments in recent work on DSGE models which shows that the
most important parameters for creating a hump-shaped response are those related to the degree of
real wage rigidity. Rabanal (2007) shows in a calibrated new-Keynesian model that the presence
of a cost channel is not suﬃcient to generate a positive response of inﬂation to monetary policy
tightening. But when he introduces real wage stickiness, a hump-shaped response emerges. In
an estimated version of this model for the US this feature disappears, however. By contrast,
Henzel et al. (2009) show for the euro area that, although the cost channel does not produce a
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hump-shaped response, it helps to explain a delayed inﬂation response. Our results are consistent
with this body of the literature and suggest that, at the aggregate level, there is no price puzzle.
But in sectors where inventory holdings or wage rigidities may play a larger role a hump-shaped
response emerges leading to a more delayed response by the aggregate CPI.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the response of disaggregate inﬂation rates to various macroeconomic
shocks and idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations, using a FAVAR approach. Additionally, we assess the impact
of monetary policy on prices in various sectors. Looking at 151 disaggregated items from the
Swiss CPI from 1978 Q1 to 2008 Q3, we ﬁnd that disaggregate inﬂation rates react immediately
to idiosyncratic shocks, whereas the reaction to macroeconomic disturbances and an identiﬁed
monetary policy shock are sluggish and very heterogenous across sectors.
We analyse this heterogeneity in more detail and show that sectors with larger volatility of
idiosyncratic shocks react more readily to monetary policy. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the
rational inattention model of price setting, which relies on the assumption that ﬁrms facing more
idiosyncratic shocks react less strongly to aggregate shocks, because they pay less attention to
them. We also ﬁnd that sectors, which change prices infrequently, react less strongly but if they
do change their prices, they adjust them by a large amount. This suggests that it is sectors with
large menu costs that are responsible for the sluggish response rather than rational inattention.
Moreover, in line with ﬁndings for the US (Bernanke et al., 2005), the response of the aggregate
CPI to a monetary policy shock no longer displays a price puzzle when applying the FAVAR
methodology. The aggregate CPI is lowered 6 to 7 quarters after the monetary policy tightening.
However, we ﬁnd that durable goods and services prices show a very sluggish response to monetary
policy tightening. This may be related to the cost channel of monetary policy. That gives an
indication of the sectors that could be monitored more closely by monetary policy makers aiming
to steer the aggregate inﬂation rate. The ﬁnding that rents exhibit a hump-shaped response can
be explained by the fact that rents are linked to the mortgage rate in Switzerland.
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Figure 8: Output gap versus inverse real activity factor
























Notes: The ﬁgure gives an output gap measure (in percent) calculated by the Swiss National Bank according
to a production function approach (dashed line). In addition, it gives the real activity factor (solid line, inverse
right-hand scale).
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Figure 9: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock
(monetary aggregates)














































Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
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Figure 10: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock
(interest rates)



















(b) Government bonds (10y)




















Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
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Figure 11: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock
(consumer prices)

























(b) Consumer prices: goods












(c) Consumer prices: services











(d) Consumer prices excl. rents












(e) Expected consumer prices
Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
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Figure 12: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock
(prices and exchange rates prices)












(a) Prices of total supply
































(d) Expected wholesale prices





















Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
3434 35
Figure 13: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock (real
activity I)































































Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
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Figure 14: Response of key macroeconomic variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock (real
activity II)































































Notes: Estimated impulse responses (in percent) to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock along with 90% conﬁdence
intervals. The monetary shock is a surprise increase of 25 basis points in the 3M Libor.
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B Supplementary tables
Table 4: Macroeconomic data set
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
Real output and income
GDP SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Swiss GDP
PRICONS SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Private consumption
GOVCONS SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Government consumption
INVEST SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Gross ﬁxed capital formation
EQINV SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Equipment investment
CSTRINV SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Construction investment
EXPORT SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Exports (goods and services)
EXPSER SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Exports (services)
IMPORT SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Imports (goods and services)
IMPSER SA dlog 1965Q1 2008Q4 Imports (services)
INDPROD SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production
IPIFOOD SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: food and
beverages
IPIWOOD SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: wood
IPICHEM SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: chemistry
IPIMIN SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: mining
IPIMET SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: metal
IPIENG SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: engineering
IPIENWA SA dlog 1964Q1 2008Q4 Industrial production: energy and
water supply
RETSALES SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 Retail sales: total
RETSALCF SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 Retail sales: clothing and footwear
RETSALFOOD SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 Retail sales: food
RETSALEOTH SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 Retail sales: other
Employment and hours
MANPOW SA level 1972Q2 2008Q4 Manpower index (linked with
Publicitas index)
VACAN dlog 1956M1 2009M2 Vacancies
TOTEMP SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Employment
EMP1 SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Employment: sector 1
EMP2 SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Employment: sector 2
EMP3 SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Employment: sector 3
EMPTEXT SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: textile industry
EMPCHEM SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: chemistry
EMPMET SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: machinery
EMPMANU SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: manufacturing
EMPIND SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment (excl. construction)
EMPCSTR SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: construction
EMPTRA2 SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: wholesale and retail)
EMPREST SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: hotels and restaurants
EMPCOMM SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: communication
EMPFINA SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: ﬁnancial sector
EMPINS SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: insurance
EMPEDUC2 SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: education and R&D
EMPADM SA dlog 1977Q1 2008Q4 Employment: public administration,
social system, military
HOURS dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Hours worked
URATE SA level 1948M1 2009M2 Unemployment rate
OVERTIME dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Overtime
REDHRS SA log 1975M10 2008M12 Hours not worked due to short-time
working (Kurzarbeit)
PARTRATE dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Participation rate
Housing starts and sales
HAPPR log 1970Q3 2008Q4 Housing approvals: cities (more than
10,000 inhabitants)
HFINISH SA log 1970Q3 2008Q4 Housing ﬁnished: cities (more than
10,000 inhabitants)
CIVENG log 1948Q1 2008Q4 Civil engineering
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
RESBUILD log 1948Q1 2008Q4 Residential building
OTHBUILD log 1948Q1 2008Q4 Other construction
CEMENT SA level 1970Q3 2008Q4 Cement deliveries
Real inventories
INVENT level 1970Q1 2008Q4 Change in inventories
Orders
NOISEC2 SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 New orders: sector 2 excl.
construction
UOISEC2 SA dlog 1975Q1 2008Q4 Outstanding orders: sector 2 excl.
construction
Stock prices
UBS100 dlog 1960Q1 2008Q4 UBS 100 index
MSCI dlog 1969M12 2009M3 Morgan Stanley Capital International:
Switzerland
TOTMAR dlog 1973M1 2009M3 Swiss Market Index: SMI
Exchange rates
CHFUSD dlog 1914M1 2009M2 CHF/USD
CHFEUR dlog 1905M5 1905M7 CHF/ECU until 1998M12 (up to
1979.M10 approximation using
movements in CHF/DM), then
CHF/EUR
CHFJPY dlog 1972M1 2009M2 CHF/JPY
CHFUSD VOL dlog 1970M1 2009M2 Exchange rate volatility: CHF/USD,
realised volatility
CHFJPY VOL dlog 1972M1 2009M2 Exchange rate volatility: CHF/JPY,
realised volatility
REER24 level 1972M1 2009M2 Real eﬀective exchange rate, 24 trading
partners
REEREUR level 1972M1 2009M2 Real eﬀective exchange rate (EUR)
REERUSD level 1972M1 2009M2 Real eﬀective exchange rate (USD)
REERJPY level 1972M1 2009M2 Real eﬀective exchange rate (JPY)
Interest rates
LIBOR3M level 1974M3 2009M3 Eurozins until 1997M12, then 3M
Libor
ZSEIDG10 level 1972M1 2009M2 Confederation bond yield (10 years)
ZSEIDG level 1957Q1 2008Q4 Swiss Government bond yield
MRATE level 1956M12 2009M1 Mortgage rate: Cantonal Banks
SPRSNB level 1972M1 2009M2 Spread (10 year Confederation bond to
3M Libor)
Money and credit
M1 SA dlog 1950M1 2009M1 Monetary aggregates: M1
M2 SA dlog 1950M1 2009M1 Monetary aggregates: M2
M3 SA dlog 1950M1 2009M1 Monetary aggregates: M3
MB SA dlog 1950M1 2009M1 Monetary base
NOTENUML SA dlog 1950M1 2009M1 Banknote circulation
MORTGAGE dlog 1975M6 2009M1 Mortgage credit outstanding, domestic
(Swiss banks and Postﬁnance; in CHF)
COVLOANS dlog 1975M6 2009M1 Covered loans outstanding, domestic,
in CHF
UNCOVLO dlog 1975M6 2009M1 Uncovered loans outstanding,
domestic, in CHF
Price indexes
IPI dlog 1963M1 2009M2 Import price index
PPI dlog 1963M1 2009M2 Producer price index
PITS dlog 1963M1 2009M2 Price index of total supply
PCONS dlog 1963M1 2009M2 Price index of total supply: consumer
goods
CPI SA dlog 1921M1 2009M2 Consumer price index (CPI)
CPINOOIL SA dlog 1966M9 2009M2 CPI excl. oil
CPINOREN dlog 1966M9 2009M2 CPI excl. rents
CPIGOOD SA dlog 1966M9 2009M2 CPI: goods
CPISERV dlog 1966M9 2009M2 CPI: services
OIL dlog 1966M9 2009M2 Oil: Brent, USD/Barrel
SMPICRB dlog 1974M1 2009M3 Commodity price index: CRB
COPIHWWA dlog 1960M1 2009M1 Commodity price index: HWWA
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
Surveys
EXPECON SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 SECO Consumer conﬁdence index:
expected economic situation
EXPPRIC SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 SECO Consumer conﬁdence index:
expected price development
EXPJOB SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 SECO Consumer conﬁdence index:
expected job safety
EXPFIN SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 SECO Consumer conﬁdence index:
expected ﬁnancial situation
EXPTOT SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 SECO Consumer conﬁdence index
EXPKOF SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 KOF Consumer conﬁdence
KOF01 SA level 1966M11 2009M3 Outstanding orders, opinion
KOF03 SA level 1966M11 2009M3 Outstanding orders, previous month
KOF05 SA level 1966M11 2009M3 New orders, compared to previous
month
KOF07 SA level 1967M2 2009M3 Expected new orders
KOF09 SA level 1966M11 2009M3 Production previous month
KOF11 SA level 1967M2 2009M3 Expected production
KOF13 SA level 1967M2 2009M3 Planned activity
KOF17 SA level 1968M4 2009M3 Inventories pre-products, opinion
KOF19 SA level 1966M11 2009M3 Inventories ﬁnished goods, previous
month
KOF21 SA level 1967M2 2009M3 Inventories ﬁnished goods, opinion
KOF23 SA level 1967M2 2009M3 Expected buying of pre-products
KOF25 SA level 1967Q2 2009Q1 Capacity utilisation in %
KOF27 SA level 1967Q2 2009Q1 Revenue situation
KOF29 SA level 1967Q2 2009Q1 Technical production capacities,
previous quarter
KOF31 SA level 1967Q2 2009Q1 Technical production capacities,
opinion
KOF33 SA level 1970Q2 2009Q1 Expected purchase prices,
manufacturing
KOFINDBS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Business sentiment, manufacturing
KOFRSEXPS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Expected sales, retail
KOFRSBS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Business sentiment, retail
KOFRSJS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Inventories, retail
KOFRSLS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Inventory holdings, retail
KOFRSEXPP SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Expected purchases, retail
KOFWSSAL SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Sales compared to past year, wholesale
KOFWSSTO SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Inventories compared to last year,
wholesale
KOFWSJST SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Inventories, wholesale
KOFWSDEL SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Delivery lags, wholesale
KOFWSEXPD SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Expected delivery lags, wholesale
KOFWSEXPPP SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Expected purchase prices, wholesale
KOFWSEXPSP SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Expected sales prices, wholesale
KOFWSBS SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Business sentiment, wholesale
CONSFIN SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Past ﬁnancial situation, consumer
survey
CONSECO SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Past real activity, consumer survey
CONSPRI SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Past price developments, consumer
survey
CONSSAVE SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Savings, consumer survey
CONSPURCH SA level 1972Q4 2009Q1 Time for larger purchases, consumer
survey
International
USGDP SA dlog 1959Q1 2008Q4 GDP United States
JPGDP SA dlog 1959Q1 2008Q4 GDP Japan
EMUGDP SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 GDP EMU Area
PMIUSA SA level 1970Q1 2008Q4 PMI USA
OECDLEAD SA level 1970Q1 2008Q4 OECD composite leading indicator
WORLDTRD SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 World Trade: goods and services
MSCIWLD SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 MSCI World
HWWAUSD SA dlog 1970Q1 2008Q4 HWWA commodity index (USD basis)
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Table 5: Price data set
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
A01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Rice
A02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Flour
A03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Bread
A04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Small baked goods
A05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Viennese pastries, pastry products
A06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Biscuit/rusk products
A07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Pasta
A08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other cereal products
A09 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Beef
A10 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Veal
A11 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Pork
A12 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Lamb
A13 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Poultry
A14 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other meat
A15 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Sausages
A16 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Processed meat and cooked meat
A17 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Fresh ﬁsh
A18 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Frozen ﬁsh
A19 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Tinned ﬁsh and smoked ﬁsh
A20 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Whole milk
A21 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other type of milk
A22 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Hard and semi-hard cheese
A23 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Fresh, soft and melted cheese
A24 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other dairy products
A25 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Cream
A26 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Eggs
A27 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Butter
A28 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Margarine, fats, edible oils
A29 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Citrus fruit
A30 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Stone fruit
A31 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Pome fruit
A32 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Bananas
A33 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other fruits
A34 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Dried, frozen and tinned fruit
A35 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Fruiting vegetables
A36 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Root vegetables
A37 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Salad vegetables
A38 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Brassicas
A39 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Onions
A40 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other vegetables
A41 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Potatoes
A42 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Dried, frozen, tinned vegetables
A43 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Jam and honey
A44 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Chocolate
A45 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Ice-cream
A47 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Sugar
A48 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Soups, spices, sauces
A49 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Ready-made foods
A50 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Coﬀee
A51 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Tea
A52 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Cocoa and nutritional beverages
A53 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Natural mineral water
A54 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Soft drinks
A55 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Fruit or vegetable juices
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco
B01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Spirits/brandies
B02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Liqueurs and aperitifs
B03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Swiss red wine
B04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Foreign red wine
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
B05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Swiss white wine
B06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Foreign white wine
B08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Beer
Clothing and footwear
C01 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Coats, jackets (men)
C02 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Suits (men)
C03 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Trousers (men)
C04 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Shirts (men)
C05 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other clothing (men)
C06 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Underwear (men)
C07 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Coats, jackets (women)
C08 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Costumes, trouser suits, dresses (women)
C09 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Skirts (women)
C10 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Trousers (women)
C11 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Jackets (women)
C12 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Blouses (women)
C13 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other clothing (women)
C14 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Underwear (women)
C15 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Coats and jackets (children)
C16 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Trousers and skirts (children)
C17 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other clothing (children)
C18 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Underwear underwear (children)
C19 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Haberdashery and knitting wool
C20 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other clothing accessories
C21 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Dry-cleaning and repair of garments
C22 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Footwear including repairs
C23 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Women’s footwear
C24 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Men’s footwear
C25 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Children’s footwear
C26 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Shoe repairs
C27 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Sportswear
Housing and energy
D01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Rent
D03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Products for housing maintenance and repair
D04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Services for housing maintenance and repair
D07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Heating oil
Household furniture and furnishings and routine maintenance
E01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Furniture living room
E02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Furniture bedroom
E03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Furnishings
E04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Furniture, kitchen and garden
E05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Floor coverings and carpets
E06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Bed linen and household linen
E07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Curtains and curtain accessories
E08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Major household appliances
E09 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Smaller electric household appliances
E10 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Kitchen utensils
E11 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Tableware and cutlery
E12 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Tools, equipment and accessories for house and
garden
E13 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Detergents and cleaning products




G01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 New cars
G02 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Second-hand cars
G03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Motorcycles
G04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Bicycles
G05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Spare parts and accessories
G06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Tyres and accessories
G07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Fuels
G08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Repair services and work
Communications
–
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Identiﬁcator Seas. adj. Transform. Start End Description
Recreation and culture
I01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Television sets and audiovisual appliances
I02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Photographic, cinematographic equipment
and optical instruments
I03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Personal computers and accessories
I05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Recording media
I06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Repair and installation
I07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Games, toys and hobbies
I08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Sports equipment
I09 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Plants and ﬂowers
I10 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Pets and related products
I12 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Sporting events
I14 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Mountain railways, ski lifts
I15 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Cinema
I16 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Theatre and concerts
I18 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Photographic services
I19 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Leisure-time courses
I20 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Books and brochures
I21 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Newspapers and periodicals (purchased singly)
I22 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Newspapers and periodicals (by subscription)
I23 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Writing and drawing materials




K01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Meals taken in restaurants and caf´ es
K02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Wine (in restaurant)
K03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Beer (in restaurant)
K04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Spirits, other alcoholic drinks (in restaurant)
K05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Coﬀee and tea (in restaurant)
K06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Mineral water and soft drinks (in restaurant)
K07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Other non-alcoholic beverages (in restaurant)
K08 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Beverages (in canteens)
K09 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Hotels
K10 SA dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Alternative accommodation facilities
Other goods and services
L01 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Hairdressing establishments
L02 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Soaps and foam baths
L03 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Hair-care products
L04 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Dental-care products
L05 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Beauty products and cosmetics
L06 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Paper articles for personal hygiene
L07 dlog 1977Q4 2008Q4 Personal care appliances
Table 6: Average weights from 1978 to 2008 of the CPI index items included in the sample









Services excl. rents 16.7
Rents 19.5
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Table 7: 15 largest factor loadings in absolute size by factors
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Inﬂation (Inverse) real activity Clothing prices 3M Libor
Ident. Load. Ident. Load. Ident. Load. Ident. Load.
A23 2.36 KOFINDBS -2.77 C09 -3.06 REERJPY -1.08
REERJPY 2.35 KOF01 -2.66 C08 -3.00 ZSEIDG10 1.02
A22 2.30 KOF21 2.65 C07 -2.96 KOF31 -1.00
URATE -2.25 CONSECO -2.62 C12 -2.89 ZSEIDG 0.96
CPIGOOD 2.10 EXPTOT -2.62 C01 -2.88 MRATE 0.95
I09 2.09 EXPKOF -2.62 C05 -2.80 SPRKOF -0.89
KOF31 2.07 KOFWSBS -2.60 C13 -2.78 A27 -0.88
A08 2.05 KOFWSSAL -2.57 C24 -2.54 SPRSNB -0.87
CPI 2.05 KOFWSDEL -2.55 C11 -2.45 CEMENT 0.75
B03 2.04 REDHRS 2.53 C10 -2.41 I01 0.74
A27 2.00 KOF13 -2.49 C17 -2.38 E10 0.73
A25 1.97 KOF23 -2.41 C23 -2.29 NOTENUML -0.73
I24 1.93 OECDLEAD -2.41 C03 -2.22 I02 0.70
E08 1.92 KOF03 -2.41 C25 -2.21 A25 -0.67
CPINOOIL 1.89 KOF17 2.40 WORLDTRD -2.20 A08 -0.66
Notes: The table gives the largest 15 factor loadings in absolute size for each factor.
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Table 8: 15 largest correlations in absolute size by factors
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Inﬂation (Inverse) real activity Clothing prices 3M Libor
Ident. Corr. Ident. Corr. Ident. Corr. Ident. Corr.
CONSPRI 0.89 KOFINDBS -0.91 C09 -0.58 SPRKOF -0.96
SPRKOF -0.87 EXPTOT -0.88 C08 -0.57 SPRSNB -0.95
SPRSNB -0.87 EXPKOF -0.88 C07 -0.56 ZSEIDG 0.91
CPISERV 0.80 KOF01 -0.88 C01 -0.56 ZSEIDG10 0.91
CPINOOIL 0.80 CONSECO -0.88 C12 -0.55 CONSPRI 0.85
D04 0.80 KOF21 0.87 C13 -0.53 MRATE 0.83
EXPPRIC 0.80 KOFWSBS -0.87 C05 -0.52 EXPPRIC 0.77
E06 0.79 KOFWSSAL -0.86 C24 -0.48 CPISERV 0.75
E11 0.79 KOFWSDEL -0.85 WORLDTRD -0.46 E11 0.75
ZSEIDG 0.79 REDHRS 0.84 C10 -0.46 D04 0.74
I23 0.78 KOF13 -0.82 C11 -0.46 D01 0.73
ZSEIDG10 0.77 OECDLEAD -0.80 C17 -0.45 I23 0.73
E05 0.76 KOF17 0.80 C23 -0.44 C22 0.72
I22 0.75 KOF23 -0.79 C25 -0.43 I01 0.72
C22 0.75 KOF03 -0.79 C03 -0.42 E06 0.71
Notes: The table gives the largest 15 correlations in absolute size for each factor.
4444 45
Table 9: Cross-sectional variation of the accumulated monetary policy shock responses after 8
quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)













durationi × sizei 0.142∗∗∗
[0.049]
Constant 0.087∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ 0.086 -0.084∗∗ 0.029
[0.007] [0.096] [0.054] [0.039] [0.044]
Observations 151 151 151 124 124
R2 0.78 0.27 0.78 0.32 0.41
Notes: The duration is measured in quarters while the responses and standard deviations are measured in percent.
The frequency and size of price changes are measured as fractions and rates of changes respectively. The coeﬃcients
are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are given in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 10: Cross-sectional variation of the accumulated common component shock responses after
4 and 8 quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
responsei,4 responsei,4 responsei,8 responsei,8
durationi 0.047*** -0.019 0.062*** -0.052
[0.014] [0.027] [0.022] [0.042]
sizei -0.677 -2.790*** -0.691 -4.356***
[0.553] [0.914] [0.776] [1.405]
durationi × sizei 0.439*** 0.761***
[0.143] [0.216]
Constant -1.015*** -0.667*** -1.679*** -1.075***
[0.123] [0.180] [0.193] [0.284]
Observations 124 124 124 124
R2 0.17 0.24 0.10 0.18
Notes: The duration is measured in quarters while the responses measured in percent. The frequency and size of
price changes are measured as fractions and rates of changes respectively. The coeﬃcients are estimated by OLS.
Robust standard errors are given in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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